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DEBUGGING SOFTWARE PATENTS:
INCREASING INNOVATION AND REDUCING
UNCERTAINTY IN THE JUDICIAL REFORM OF
SOFTWARE PATENT LAW
Robert E. Thomast
Abstract
Software patents do not promote innovation, they instead reduce
it. Early in the development of the computer industry, a U.S.
presidential commission opposed the recognition of software patents,
and the Supreme Court never approved the degree of recognition that
software patents have recently enjoyed. This paper reviews the
genesis of the patentability of software patents, analyzes the social
welfare implications of recognizing software as patentable subject
matter, and examines recommendations for reform. Others have
suggested enhancing software patent claim disclosure requirements
to address social welfare losses. This paper concludes that altering
disclosure requirements would dramatically increase litigation while
reducing the value of most software patents. Instead, the only way to
optimally reform software patent law, without destroying settled
expectations of current software patent holders, is for the Supreme
Court to reinstate and prospectively apply its physical-transformation
test.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of patentability and patent infringement are among the
most contentious areas of intellectual property law.' Whereas attempts
to reform patent law in Congress face a protracted and questionable
fate, recent decisions indicate that the courts may precede Congress
on this front. For example, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
2
Justice Kennedy questioned both the strategic use of patents and the
validity of some business method patents as reasons for making
injunctive relief more difficult to obtain in patent infringement cases. 3
Although Justice Kennedy's concerns are legitimate, the genesis
of the problem is more fundamental. Historically, policy makers have
recognized that excessive use of patent exclusivity can have a
deleterious effect on commercial activities. Therefore, Congress and
the courts had traditionally been reticent to expand patent subject
matter.4 However, during the last few decades this cautious approach
has subsided, leading to the wholesale recognition of controversial
areas of innovation that provide society with little or no benefit.
5
This paper argues that the expansive recognition of certain types
of innovation-namely computer software and business methods-
1. See, e.g., Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The
Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689 (2006) [hereinafter
Thomas, Vanquishing] (examining the contentious mid-2000s battle for patent reform); Rebecca
A. Hand, Note, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking At The Cause And Effect Of A Shift In The
Standard For Issuing Patent Injunctions, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 461, 484 (2007)
(asserting that eBay is an indication that the judiciary has started addressing the alleged problem
of predatory patent infringement cases).
2. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
3. Id. at 397. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (imploring Congress to determine
whether computer software should receive patent protection); Laura R. Ford, Alchemy and
Patentability: Technology, "Useful Arts, " and the Chimerical Mind-Machine, 42 CAL. W. L.
REV. 49, 58-59 (2005) (describing the efforts of Congress and the Supreme Court to restrict the
coverage of patent subject matter).
5. See, e.g., Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the International
Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe's Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 37 (2007); Larry A. DiMatteo, The New "Problem " of Business Method Patents:
The Convergence of National Patent Laws and International Internet Transactions, 28
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the social losses attributable to business
method patents); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (proffering alternatives to protecting
software with patents); and Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025 (1990) (arguing that awarding patents for computer-implemented inventions is
inappropriate).
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impedes innovation, and that the courts are in the best position to
address this problem. 6 Although, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) has taken an initial step to resolve these
concerns in its recent In re Bilski7 decision, it may take Supreme
Court action to fully address the problems that multiple CAFC
decisions have created by recognizing software patents. 8 Software
innovation requires little investment, so patents are not needed to
promote this type of innovation. Instead, patent-generated software
monopolies dramatically increase competitors' research and
development (R&D) costs, resulting in an overall decline in
innovation.
The Supreme Court has the ability to dramatically refocus
software patent policy in a socially beneficial direction by
reinvigorating its existing precedents. These precedents require
process claims containing software to transform or reduce "an article
to a different state or thing." 9 A strict interpretation and application of
this test (the physical-transformation test) would render most pure
software and business method patent claims unpatentable. A shift in
patent policy away from the CAFC's overly inclusive interpretation
of patent subject matter will both promote innovation and reduce
software patent infringement litigation. Moreover, if existing patents
are grandfathered under this policy shift, the Court can minimize
damages to settled expectations and existing patent holders.
The analysis begins with a review of the judicial treatment of
software patent law. With its 1981 Diamond v. Diehr1° decision, the
Supreme Court ended its efforts to provide guidelines for patent
6. Business methods are part of the continuum that includes software and computer-
implemented inventions, and the courts treat business method and software as interchangeable in
determining patentability. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The scope of [patentable subject matter is] the same regardless of form-
machine or process-in which a particular claim is drafted."). Although the focus of this paper's
analysis is not business methods, the arguments apply generally to business methods as well.
7. In re Bilski, No 2007-1130, 2008 WL 4757110 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
8. See, e.g., AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d 1352 (ruling that there are no constraints other than
novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness to the patenting of business methods and software);
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(providing business methods with statutory-subject-matter status); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (arguing that courts should not restrict patent subject matter
beyond what is explicitly identified in statute); Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp.,
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (graphically displaying manipulated data on a computer monitor
reached the threshold of patentability).
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
10. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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coverage of software innovations." The CAFC, revealing a pro-
patent-expansion bias, chipped away at this restraint, eventually
removing all limitations to patent coverage of software and business
methods.' 2 To promote innovation and reduce litigation, courts should
adopt policies that not only advance social welfare but also do not
increase legal uncertainty. Using this theoretical framework, I provide
reform recommendations that balance judicial and theoretical
considerations and explain why some previously advanced
recommendations are likely to produce more problems than they
solve.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DETERMINATION OF STATUTORY
SUBJECT MATTER
A. The Development of Statutory-Subject-Matter Jurisprudence
Although patent policy is within Congress' domain, the courts
have long played a pivotal role in determining patent policy. The
constitutional authorization for patents (the "Patent Clause") is
parsimonious.1 3 While providing Congress with a single tool-periods
of exclusivity-to promote innovation, the Patent Clause fails to
provide detailed guidance about the limits of innovative activity
entitled to constitutional protection.14 The Constitution left it to
Congress to create, change, and shape patent policy to meet the
nation's evolving needs.
Congress, in turn, left to the courts much of the job of
determining subject-matter boundaries. The Patent Act of 1790
identifies statutory subject matter as including, "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein."' 5 This definition was retained in 35 U.S.C. § 101, with
minor changes. 16 The courts recognized the need to limit patent
breadth by excluding abstract principles and laws of nature from
statutory subject matter.' 7 They also excluded outcomes and results
11. Id.
12. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357-58.
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Id.
15. Robert 1. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts (Part 11), 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 487, 500 (1952).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining statutory subject matter as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof').
17. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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from patent protection. 18 The courts reasoned that allowing patent
coverage in these areas could create perpetual monopolies over
"devices or mechanisms that the patentee might not even be familiar
with or understand." 19
Patent coverage of abstract principles or laws of nature would
give individuals control over subject matter they did not create and
could prevent others from achieving results that depend on such
principles and laws. Similarly, patent coverage of outcomes and
results would prevent others from using alternative and innovative
methods for achieving comparable or identical outcomes and results.
Thus, the courts created the "means plus-function" litmus test by
limiting patent subject matter to, "the means (processes or machines)
embodying such principles that are used to achieve a result that is
useful for human beings.,
20
This reasoning, while relatively straightforward when applied to
machines, is problematic when applied to processes.2' Compared to
machines, it is far more difficult to draw a clear line between actions
that constitute processes and the actions' results. To counter these
problems, courts developed a bar against processes that solely or
primarily rely on "mental steps. 22 Courts further distinguished
processes from mental steps by recognizing only those processes that
produce tangible outcomes.2 3  This physical transformation
requirement (physical-transformation test) lasted over one hundred
years and the Supreme Court has never rejected it. 2 4
The physical-transformation test provided a clear delineation
between patentable and non-patentable subject matter. It provided,
perhaps, as objective a test as exists in patent law. However, there is
no compelling statutory basis for said requirement. Prior to the
18. Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854) ("It is for the discovery or invention of
some practicable method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is
granted, and not for the result or effect itself').
19. See Ford, supra note 4, at 60.
20. Id. at 59.
21. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880) (distinguishing between
machines and processes by stating: "A machine is a thing. A process is an act, or a mode of
acting. The one is visible to the eye,-[sic] an object of perpetual observation. The other is a
conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when being executed or performed").
22. See Ford, supra note 4, at 61-62 n.66.
23. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 n.61 (1877) (defining a process to be "an act,
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing").
24. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981). But see AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explicitly rejecting physical
transformation as a necessary condition for process patentability).
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twentieth century, it was inconceivable that an inventive process
would produce a result that was not a physical transformation of
matter. Thus, the Court's assertion in Cochrane v. Deener2 5 that a
process is "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result" was accepted without question.26 This assertion was
never an issue until the advent of computers.
Attacks on the physical-transformation test began in earnest
during the 1960s and 1970s. Despite a Presidential Commission
report recommending against recognizing computer software as
27
statutory subject matter, the U.S. Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) opened the door to recognizing software patents.28
In a series of cases, the CCPA rejected both the physical operation 29
and mental-step requirements.30 It declared that patentable subject
matter includes anything in the "technological arts," and thereby
rejected nearly one hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.31
It is not surprising that the emergence of computer technology
created a dilemma for the courts. While both computer hardware and
software are creative and indisputably useful, it is not appropriate to
treat them identically. Computers, as electronic machines, fit neatly
into the traditional patent rubric. Software, however, does not fit into
this rubric; even though computers require software to operate, and
cleverly written software is both innovative and non-obvious. On a
purely theoretical basis, there is a strong temptation to extend patent
protection to software. Yielding to this temptation, however, reduces
overall incentives to innovate and increases legal uncertainty.
32
All software is not the same. Some software arguably performs a
physical transformation of matter that is tangible and perceptible.
Arranging pixels on the screen of a computer monitor is one
example.33 In contrast, there is software that merely performs
calculations or that developers use as building blocks for other
25. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
26. Id. at 788.
27. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, TO PROMOTE
THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY (1966) [hereinafter,
CoMMIssioN REPORT).
28. See Ford, supra note 4, at 63-70.
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at 69.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See, e.g., lnre Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (arguing that a
rasterizer of electrocardiographic data is a machine that produces "a useful, concrete, and
tangible result").
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programs and computer applications.34 Such software clearly does not
satisfy the physical transformation test. Yet, without a theoretical
rationale for distinguishing between valid and invalid subject matter,
it is difficult to argue that the latter type of software is less deserving
of patent protection than software that commands other devices to
perform physical transformations. As neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court addressed this emerging technology, the urge to fill
this policy gulf was tremendous.35
Therefore, rather than follow Supreme Court precedent, the
CCPA instead adapted the law by revising a policy treatment that they
perceived to be deficient. In order to provide patent protection for
"deserving" software inventions, the CCPA and the CAFC weakened
and eventually eliminated the Supreme Court's physical-
transformation test.36 These decisions left the CAFC with no logical
basis for distinguishing valid software patent claims from invalid
claims. Judges could now either apply obtuse and ambiguous tests, or
conclude that all software inventions are statutory, provided they
produce a "useful, concrete, [and] tangible result." 37
B. The Supreme Court's Approach to Computer Software
Unlike the CCPA, the Supreme Court recognized that software
was a new class of invention. The Court cautiously considered
whether to deem it statutory subject matter. It attempted to apply
statutory law using rules of construction and case law and exhorted
Congress to develop a coherent policy to address this new class of
innovation.38 The Court deemed computer programs patentable
subject matter by default, provided they were an integral part of a
claim that included a physical transformation of matter.
Gottschalk v. Benson39 was the first Supreme Court case to
address the patentability of computer programs. 40 The disputed claim
34. BEN KLEMENS, MATH YOU CAN'T USE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND SOFTWARE 40-
42 (2006) (explaining that complex programs can be built from specialized, discrete functions
contained in function libraries, which can be used without knowing exactly how each function
performs its designated task).
35. But see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 13 (recommending against expanding
patent coverage to include computer software).
36. See supra note 8.
37. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
38. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) ("If these programs are to be
patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage,
for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide variety
of views which those operating in this field entertain." (citation omitted)).
39. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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was for a device-independent "method for converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals."41 The program's
purpose, converting concatenated binary numerals representing
decimal numbers, could be done mentally or manually using a chart.42
The Court had an easy time disposing of this patent claim because the
claim was "so abstract and sweeping" as to forestall the use of a BCD
conversion in virtually all conceivable applications.43 According to
the Supreme Court, allowing a patent on such a broad concept as this
program, the equivalent of a mathematical formula, would amount to
allowing a patent on an idea.44
Although the Court could dispose of the case based on the broad
breadth of the claimed program, Benson was, nevertheless, a difficult
decision due to its policy implications. The Court recognized that the
determination of software patentability is more appropriately a matter
for Congressional consideration.45  The Court ruled that,
"transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines. 46 However, the Court retreated from this
clear delineation by stating, "[w]e do not hold that no process patent
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents.4 7 To further emphasize their discomfort with creating
software patent policy, the Court continued, "[we do not hold] that the
[Benson] decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer., 48 However, the Court was clear that it did not believe that
software programs were patentable either directly as programs or
indirectly as processes. 49 Extending patent protection to cover
software was a job for Congress.50 In making the case for legislative
40. Id. at 73.
41. Id. at 64.
42. Id. at 66-67.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id. at 71-72.
45. Id. at 73 ("The technological problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate
to us that considered action by the Congress is needed.").
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id. at71.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 72 ("Indirect attempts to obtain [software] patents and avoid the rejection, by
drafting claims as a process, or a machine or components thereof ... rather than as a program
itself, have confused the issue further and should not be permitted" (quoting COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 27)).
50. Id. at 73.
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intervention, Benson left us an ambiguous decision subject to
conflicting interpretations.
This ambiguity led the Supreme Court to revisit the software
patentability issue six years later for the purpose of correcting the
erroneous CCPA interpretation of Benson.5 1 Without legislative
intervention, the CCPA interpreted Benson as barring software
patents only when the process claim pre-empted use of the claimed
algorithm. 52 In reviewing the CCPA's action in Parker v. Flook,53 the
Supreme Court found a claim that was not substantially different from
the rejected algorithm in Benson. In Flook, the disputed claim was a
method for calculating alarm limits for use in catalytic converters. 54
Like the Benson claim, the disputed claim was machine independent
and calculated a numerical result (an alarm limit) derived from
entered data (temperature readings).55
Rather than clarifying the law, Flook increased the ambiguity
associated with software patentability. The Court could have resolved
the case by applying the Cochrane physical-transformation test or by
concluding that the associated process was merely a clever attempt to
avoid receiving the same negative treatment as the Benson claim.
However, the Court refused to embrace or reject the physical-
transformation test. The Flook Court equivocated by acknowledging
in a footnote that one could argue that Supreme Court precedent
requires processes to change materials to a "different state or thing. ',56
However, the decision never revisited the argument raised in the
footnote.
Instead, Flook introduced a new test that added to the confusion
of the patentability of software. The Court proposed a subject-matter
test that conflated the subject matter question with the 35 U.S.C. §
102 novelty requirement. 57 The Court instructed claim reviewers to
consider the algorithm to be "well known" in the prior art and then,
subject to this constraint, evaluate whether the claim as a whole is
statutory subject matter.58 However, in reality, this approach required
a separate patentability review of the non-algorithm component of the
claim. Flook unintentionally suggested this approach by declaring
51. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
52. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1977).
53. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
54. Id. at 585.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 588 n.9 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877)).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
58. Flook, 437 U.S. at 592-94.
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that, "the discovery of such a [law of nature or mathematical
algorithm] cannot support a patent unless there is some other
inventive concept in its application."
59
The confusion created by the Supreme Court's equivocations
soon became apparent when the Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal from a rejected claim in Diehr.60 The claim employed a
computer-based algorithm in a process to continually monitor and
adjust the curing of synthetic rubber. 61 Both the patent examiner and
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals rejected
the claim. 62 The patent examiner, applying Flook, concluded that the
algorithm was non-statutory subject matter based on Benson, and that
the remaining process elements did not contain an inventive
element.63 The CCPA reversed the PTO Board of Appeals by
rejecting the Board's opinion that the inclusion of a computer
program in an otherwise statutory claim rendered the claim non-
statutory .64
In an effort to reconcile its prior decisions, the Court agreed with
the CCPA that it was possible to have a patentable claim that included
a computer program or algorithm.65 The Court's first step was to
unequivocally reiterate the continued vitality of its physical-
transformation test.66 Applying this test, the Court reasserted that any
patent claim that did not include a machine or apparatus had to
transform an article "to a different state or thing" in order to be
approved.6 7 The next step was to nullify Flook's apparent adoption of
a point-of-novelty test. The Court emphatically stated that, "[i]t is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements" and
asserted that patent claims must be considered as a whole.68 To
distinguish between the rubber-curing claim of Diamond and the
alarm-limits claim of Flook, the Court asserted that the Flook claim
covered a mathematical algorithm contained within an abstract,
59. Id. at 594.
60. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
61. Id. at 177.
62. Id. at 179, 181.
63. Id. at 180-81 ("The remaining steps-installing rubber in the press and the subsequent
closing of the press-were 'conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis of
patentability."').
64. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 892 (1979).
65. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
66. Id. at 184.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 188.
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nebulous process. 69 Therefore, even though the patent applicant
drafted the claim as an algorithm embedded in a transformative
process, the only concrete, substantive element was the description of
the mathematical algorithm.70 Hence, the Flook claim was quite
similar to the BCD conversion claim in Benson.
71
Diamond v. Chakrabarty72 also influenced the treatment of
software's statutory-subject-matter status even though it did not
directly consider software. Subsequent courts have misused a famous
quote from the case to justify lowering standards for software
patentability. In this case, the claimant engineered a bacterium that
had the then unique characteristic of being able to break down crude
oil.73 The issue was whether this living organism was statutory subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 7 4 A critical question was whether all
living organisms were by definition a product of nature and, therefore,
excluded from patent protection.
75
The Supreme Court dispelled this notion with the now famous
statement that, "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include
anything under the sun that is made by man.' 76 Living entities could
be statutory subject matter provided they are invented and not pre-
existing in nature. Inventions have properties that are a direct result of
man's handiwork and for which such properties do not exist already
in nature. 77 The non-existence of any crude-oil eating organism in
nature was clear evidence that Chakrabarty invented, not discovered,
his bacterium. Therefore, he was entitled to receive patent protection
for the invention.
78
For purposes of this discussion, the most notable aspect of this
case is the context of the Court's "anything under the sun made by
man" declaration. Inferior courts used this statement to assert that the
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the expansion of § 101
69. Id. at 187.
70. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978).
71. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
72. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
73. Id. at 305.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
75. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.
76. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923 (1952)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 310 ... the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature .... His [invention] is not nature's handiwork, but his
own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under 101.").
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statutory subject matter to include computer programs. 79 However,
this interpretation is incorrect. Rather, the Court's objective with this
80quote was to dispel arbitrary limitations on statutory subject matter.
Claims still had to qualify as § 101 processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter.8' The Court concluded that
a living being qualifies as a manufacture if "made by man."8' 2 The
concern with patent claims that include software or mathematical
algorithms is whether they qualify as valid patent processes under §
101.3
A two-part test was implicit in Chakrabarty. The first part
determines whether the claim was an invention or a discovery of a
product of nature. 84 If an invention, then the claim must fit into one of
the § 101 allowed categories. 85 The Court considered the bacterium
either a manufacture or composition of matter.86 The Diehr decision,
which followed Chakrabarty, supports this interpretation. Although
software may be an invention, it still must be a valid § 101 process to
receive patent protection.87 Diehr reemphasized that a claim that did
not include a machine must be rejected unless the claim involved the
physical transformation of an article from one state to another.88 Thus,
whereas a "naked" computer program may meet the invention
requirement, it would not satisfy Diehr's physical transformation
requirement.
C. The CAFC and the Dismantling of the Physical-
Transformation Test
After 1982, the Supreme Court ceased considering software
patentability questions, thereby ceding the ability to shape software
79. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane); Arrhythmia Research
Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
80. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 ("[The sun quotation] is not to suggest that 101 has no
limits or that it embraces every discovery.").
81. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
82. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
83. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
84. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 (". . . the relevant distinction was not between living
and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.").
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. at 309 ("His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter.").
87. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
88. Id. at 184.
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patent policy to the federal courts. The newly formed CAFC replaced
the CCPA, but continued the CCPA's generally expansive
interpretation of statutory subject matter. While State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Trust Financial Group, Inc.,89 which removed
the common-law business method patent prohibition, may be the
CAFC's most famous software patent decision, two earlier decisions
were also pivotal in the federal court's expansion of statutory subject
matter.90
In Arrhythmia Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp., 9 1 the
CAFC reviewed a claim for a process to identify the risk of
ventricular tachycardia in heart attack patients by monitoring and
analyzing heart activity using an electrocardiograph device (EKG).92
EKGs use electrodes attached to a patient's body to record the heart's
electrical activity.93 EKGs then display the observed waveform
information on a monitor or record it on a chart. 94 In the patent claim,
the included EKG also fed digital waveform information to a digital
computer for analysis. 95 The output of this analysis provided
physicians with the means to distinguish between high-risk patients
who require preventative treatment with potentially dangerous drugs
and low-risk patients.
96
The biggest question was whether the Arrhythmia Research
claim could satisfy the Supreme Court's physical-transformation test.
The Arrhythmia Research claim appeared to be very similar to the
rejected alarm-limits claim in Flook.97 As in Flook, the contribution
over prior art was limited to the computer-based component of the
claim.98 In addition, both claims received input in the form of
conventional data-temperatures in Flook 99 and EKG measurements
in Arrhythmia Research.100 Moreover, in both cases data was the end
product. The only significant difference between the two claims is
89. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
90. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
91. Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
92. Id. at 1054.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1055.
96. Id. at 1054.
97. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1978).
98. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055.
99. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
100. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1054.
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that the Arrhythmia Research claim included the EKG, the data-
measuring device, whereas the Flook claim did not include a device to
measure process variables.' 0' More important, the Arrhythmia
Research innovation appeared to fail the Supreme Court's physical-
transformation test because the claim did not transform an article
from one state to another.
The CAFC avoided these obstacles by drawing conclusions that
substantially lowered the threshold for software patents. First, the
court concluded that the EKG's reading of electrical heart activity
"transformed" such readings into digital signals. Second, the
computer-based analysis of the EKG generated waveforms
constituted a physical transformation of an electrical signal, a heart's
electrical impulses, into a different state.10 2 In essence, the court
concluded that measuring a physical phenomenon, recording the
resultant data, and then manipulating that data in a digital computer
meets the physical transformation requirement.
To evaluate the validity of this assertion, it is useful to ask
whether the Arrhythmia Research claim is most analogous to the
rejected Flook alarm-limits claim or the validated Diehr rubber-curing
process claim. According to Diehr, the Flook claim provided a
method for computing an alarm-limit. "[A]n 'alarm-limit' is simply a
number and the [Flook] Court concluded that the application sought
to protect a formula for computing this number."' 1 3 The Arrhythmia
Research claim provided a method for isolating and filtering "noise"
from the portion of a patient's EKG chart that is most likely to exhibit
anomalies in the patient's EKG wave patterns. 0 4 The presence of
such anomalies provides an indication of a high risk of a specific
heart disease.1
0 5
Although the method's output was far more complex than the
alarm-limit "number" in Flook, the Arrhythmia Research claim output
was still data, whether represented graphically or numerically.
Although the Arrhythmia Research claim's pre-solution use of an
EKG is a difference, the claim contained no significant industrial
post-solution activity. There is no conversion of a chemical into a
different state and, unlike the Diehr claim, the solution does not
101. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
102. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059-60.
103. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981).
104. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1055 ("[F]iltering is described as the critical feature of the
Simson invention, in that it enables detection of the late potentials by eliminating certain
perturbations that obscure these signals.").
105. Id. at 1054.
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signal the automatic closing and opening of an industrial mold.10 6 One
way to make the Arrhythmia Research monitoring claim analogous to
the rubber-curing claim would be to allow the method to
automatically administer an appropriate drug therapy to patients
found to be at high risk through the associated monitoring. Without
such additional substantive steps, the Arrhythmia Research
monitoring claim is clearly closer to the Flook alarm-limits claim.
In In re Alappat,10 7 the CAFC paved the way for the patenting of
pure software claims by jettisoning the Supreme Court's physical-
transformation test.10 8 The claim was a computer program that
accepted a waveform data sequence (vector list) as input.'0 9 The
computer program (a rasterizer), residing in a conventional digital
computer, then processed and filtered the resulting data to produce
output data amenable to display on a cathode ray tube. 10 While the
rasterizer was at the heart of the claim, Alappat chose to draft the
patent application as a machine claim."'l However, for meeting § 101
requirements, the PTO Board of Appeals required the claim to meet
the same standards as a process that included software." 12
The CAFC decided Alappat on policy grounds. Whereas
Arrhythmia Research trivialized the Diehr physical-transformation
test, Alappat completely ignored it. Alappat attempted to ascertain the
limitations on software patentability by divining the policy bases for
such limitations. Rather than rely on Supreme Court precedents dating
back to the nineteenth century,' 3 the CAFC asserted that Diehr
identified just three categories of subject matter that are not entitled to
patent protection: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas." 4 The CAFC then drew the inference that a claim including
software is non-statutory only to the extent that the claim as a whole
"represent[s] nothing more than abstract ideas." ' 1 5 Thus, Alappat
switched the burden of proof for claims containing software. Instead
of having to meet the burden of proving the claim is § 101 subject
106. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-87.
107. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
108. Id. (concluding that the proper test of a claim that contains mathematical elements is
to determine whether the claim as a whole falls within one of the designated exclusions).
109. Id. at 1537.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1539.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
114. Alappat, 33 F.3dat 1542.
115. Id. at 1543.
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matter, subsequent challengers had to show only that the claim, as a
whole, did not fit into one of the three designated patent-subject-
matter exclusion categories. 16 Under this standard, the CAFC had no
trouble concluding that the rasterizer claim produced "a useful,
concrete, and tangible result" that was patentable." 1
7
Alappat substantially lowered the software patentability hurdle.
Alappat's "useful, concrete, and tangible" test provided a much lower
threshold to patentability than did the Diehr physical-transformation
requirement. Although it is likely that the BCD claim in Benson
would still be rejected using this test, the alarm-limits claim in Parker
v. Flook would be a much closer call. Alarm limits are clearly useful
and, using the Alappat logic, may well produce concrete and tangible
results. Alappat further weakened the software patentability barrier by
ruling that a software program employed in a conventional digital
computer could qualify as a machine claim for § 101 subject matter
purposes.11 8 Framing a claim as a machine makes it more difficult to
argue that the claim does not produce concrete and tangible results.
State Street Bank'"9 and AT&T120 removed all remaining § 101
impediments to software patents. State Street Bank involved a
computerized accounting system used to allocate returns for mutual
fund shareholders.' 12  The AT&T patent identified a method for
recording useful billing information from long-distance telephone
callers. 122 These cases took a step beyond Alappat, in that their patent
claims consisted entirely of business applications. Prior to State Street
Bank, methods for conducting business did not generally satisfy the
statutory subject matter requirement (the business method
exception). 123 State Street Bank rejected the business method
exception, asserting that reliance on 35 U.S.C. § 101 and patent law in
general are sufficient to evaluate such claims. 124 The court employed
Alappat's useful, concrete, and tangible result test to evaluate the
116. Id. at 1544 ("[T]he proper inquiry.., is to see whether the claimed subject matter as
a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept ... which in essence represents nothing more
than a 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract idea."').
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1545.
119. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
120. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
121. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1370.
122. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3dat 1353.
123. See DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 14 ("Historically, business methods were not
patentable under American patent law.").
124. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
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mutual fund accounting method as constituting statutory subject
matter. 125
AT&T explicitly extinguished Diehr's physical-transformation
test. Excel Corporation defended AT&T's infringement claim on the
patent's failure to effect a physical transformation. 26 Ignoring the
physical transformation discussion in Diehr,127 the CAFC, instead,
focused on the Court's use of "e.g." in Diehr to infer that physical
transformation was one of multiple ways software could satisfy § 101
subject-matter requirements.' 28 The court then proclaimed that the
useful, concrete, and tangible result test had supplanted the physical-
transformation test in stating: "[w]hatever may be left of the earlier
test, if anything, this type of physical limitations analysis seems of
little value."'129 Thus, software and business methods no longer
receive statutory-subject-matter scrutiny. Any software claim drafted
in terms of a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
overcomes the § 101 hurdle.
III. SOCIAL WELFARE AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
A policy enhances social welfare if society overall, by a chosen
metric, is better off than under the status quo or an alternative policy.
The typical measure is whether the benefits of increasing innovation
through a given patent policy exceed losses resulting from
concomitant reductions in competition. 130 Software patent analyses
typically employ a social welfare analysis as their primary theoretical
framework.1 31 While social welfare is important, any analysis of a
judicial-implemented policy must also evaluate how any
recommendations affect legal uncertainty. If implementing a reform
recommendation increases legal uncertainty, any reform gains may be
neutralized by reductions in predictability and increases in litigation.
This paper refutes the hypothesis that patents provide incentives
for software innovation. Not only do patents not increase software
innovation, they actually reduce innovation incentives. This result is
125. Id. at 1373.
126. AT&TCorp., 172 F.3dat 1358-59.
127. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183-84.
128. AT&TCorp., 172 F.3d at 1358-59.
129. Id. at 1359.
130. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990).
131. See, e.g., Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 37-41 (2007) (arguing that software
patents produce dead-weight losses); Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 868-84 (employing
welfare economics to determine optimal patent scope by industry type).
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not surprising. Even analyses that begrudgingly accept the existence
of software patents base their acceptance on pragmatic considerations
rather than economic optimality. 132 According to these arguments,
software patents are a fait accompli. Therefore, rather than offer a
solution that provides optimal treatment of software patent claims,
these commentators offer reform recommendations that ameliorate
major software patent flaws without considering the seemingly radical
step of banning software patents. 33 Although ameliorative measures
have an appeal because they address some economics-based
criticisms, they do not alleviate welfare losses due to uncertainty. In
fact, such measures likely increase uncertainty-based welfare losses
by augmenting the discretionary judgments that decision makers in
the patent review process make.
A. Economic Analysis of Software Patents
1. Overview
The Constitution grants Congress the power to promote
innovation through its patent power.' 34 The tradeoff is that the
exclusivity gained through patents provides holders with monopoly-
like powers over their patents' subject matter. 135 If the product of a
patent is in high demand and there are few or no close substitutes, the
patent grant gives the patent holder power to set his prices above a
competitive level. This power is enhanced when demand is highly
132. See, e.g., Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) ("With some eighty thousand software patents already
issued, the Federal Circuit endorsing patentability without qualification, and the Supreme Court
assiduously avoiding the question, software patentability is a matter for the history books."
(citations omitted)).
133. Id.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135. Commentators are careful to avoid characterizing intellectual property rights as
monopolies generally because there is a weak mapping, at best, between patent ownership and
monopoly power. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game:
How the Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can
Promote Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, n.18 (2003) ("One of the most common
errors is in describing intellectual property rights as 'monopolies."'); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.3, at 219 (1985) ("Many patents confer
absolutely no market power on their owners .... ); Nat'l Inst. on Indus. & Intell. Prop., The
Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547
(1985) ("Statistical studies suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer very little
monopoly power .... ).
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inelastic, as is the case of essential pharmaceuticals.1 36 If the product
is one that consumers cannot live-or live well-without, then demand
is insensitive to price changes. However, when producers exert
monopoly power, society incurs losses due to suboptimal production
and non-competitively high prices. 137
Paradoxically, an additional implication of monopoly power is
that the monopolist has less incentive to innovate than does a firm
operating in a competitive market.138 The monopolist, receiving an
extra-competitive return from the status quo, has less need to replace
his dominant product than does a producer in a competitive market
receiving zero economic profits. 39 Instead, the monopolist may invest
in blocking competitors' efforts in order to maintain the profit-
producing monopoly.1 40  Seeking and enforcing patent rights is
consistent with this strategy. Historically, patent and copyright
holders have prevented or delayed market entry by obtaining
extensions to periods of exclusivity and by erecting greater legal
barriers to unauthorized use of their protected intellectual property. 4'
136. PATRICIA M. DANZON, PRICE COMPARISONS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS: A REVIEW OF
U.S. AND CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES 25 (1999) ("[T]he demand for drugs is likely to be more
inelastic than the demand for other consumer goods ....").
137. See generally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND ECONOMIC
WELFARE (1969) (analyzing the tradeoff between patents' enhanced incentives and the
reduction in competition due to patent exclusivity).
138. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1604 (2003) ("monopolist can afford to be lazy"); MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1982).
139. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
260 (10th ed. 2006) ("[T]here is little incentive for management [in a monopoly] to make the
effort to produce efficiently with a minimum of waste or to undertake the expense and risks of
innovation.").
140. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 207, 210 (2006) ("The paramount motivation for [obtaining patents] is not the expectation
of a patent monopoly, but rather the hope of preempting and blocking others from obtaining
patents that might impede their own innovations .... ); Michael J. Malinowski & Radhika Rao,
Legal Limitations on Genetic Research and the Commercialization of its Results, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 45, 49 (2006) ("[A gene patent gives] its owner the power to prevent others from
conducting research, performing tests, or developing therapies for that gene .... As a result,
gene patents may actually hinder innovation .... ); Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 865
("[T]he original patentee may use her patent as a 'holdup' right, in an attempt to gamer as much
of the value of the improvement as possible."). But see Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2001) (countering
Paul Romer's antitrust testimony that Microsoft had used its market power to limit competition).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (establishing the copyright terms for anonymous works,
pseudonymous works, and works for hire, as the shorter of 95 years from publication or 120
years from creation); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (reflecting Congress' change of the
calculation of patent terms from 17 years from issuance to 20 years from the date of filing to
bring the United States into compliance with the Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of
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Some scholars believe that the gains from issuing patents do not
exceed the associated economic losses. 42 Empirically, software
technology developed satisfactorily prior to the recognition of
software patents, and there is little to suggest that continued software
development requires patent protection. 143 In addition, the assertion of
patent rights impedes the attempts of others to innovate by blocking
their efforts or significantly raising their costs. 14 4 In some industries,
innovation may be nearly impossible for anyone other than companies
with large patent portfolios because new products often require
obtaining rights to use dozens or even hundreds of patent-protected
technologies. 145 Companies with large patent portfolios often cross-
license patents in order to avoid litigation and gain needed patent
rights. 46 This practice benefits large companies at the expense of
smaller companies. Without patents to trade, smaller companies and
not-for-profit entities must negotiate license fees without leverage or
risk litigation in order to obtain access to technology required for
competition. 47 These costs of acquiring technology rights have a
pernicious impact on small companies' competitiveness. This
Intellectual Property Rights); Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 26, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93 (1994)
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.).
142. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovations, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) (asserting
that the lack of patents does not deter innovation in many industries).
143. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 201 (2004) ("[S]oftware innovation was flourishing before the 1980s, when the
CAFC clarified and broadened the patentability of software. This seems to show that patents for
software are not necessary."). See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 13 ("It is noted
that the creation of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence
of patent protection.").
144. See FED'L TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY pt. 11, § A, at 5 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l 0/innovationrptsummary.pdf ("One firm's
questionable patent may lead its competitor to forgo R&D in the areas that the patent improperly
covers.").
145. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket. Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001).
146. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived? 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 468 (2004) ("[l]f every competitor in
a field knows that the others are also obtaining patents, there is less of a tendency to engage in
patent warfare. Assertions may not be made at all; when they do occur, disputes are settled by
cross licensing."); Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J.
ON REG. 359, 363-70 (1999).
147. See Dreyfuss, supra note 146.
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reduction in competition adds to the social welfare losses attributable
to patents.
2. Prospect Theory
Other economists believe patents play an important role in
promoting innovation. Edmund Kitch speculated that the absence of
patent rights produces a tragedy of the commons in that failing to
assign exclusive rights leads to inadequate development of
innovations.1 48 In the tragedy of the commons, the ability of multiple
private parties to consume a good in common supply for less than
their consumption's social costs leads to the depletion of such goods
due to overuse or over consumption.149 Analogously, under Kitch's
prospect theory, failing to assign property rights to innovative
technology leads to inadequate or rushed development of technology
because multiple private parties will exploit the innovation without
incurring the costs of that development. As a result, there is
inadequate investment in innovation. 150 If, however, an innovator has
a property interest, he has the breathing room to continue developing
the technology without fear of appropriation by a competitor. 51 The
property right also allows the innovator to coordinate licenses to other
parties in order to avoid inefficient duplication of development
effort.
52
Others reject Kitch's prospect theory. Robert Merges and
Richard Nelson argue that, "the real problem is not controlling
overfishing [as in the tragedy of the commons], but preventing
underfishing after exclusive rights have been granted."'' 53 The two
contrasting views both have validity. Merges and Nelson observed
that technological advances are not homogeneous across industries.1
54
They identified four types of inventions: discrete, cumulative,
chemical, and science-based. 55 The cumulative and discrete
categories are most relevant to this inquiry. Discrete inventions are
autonomous and have limited impact on subsequent innovations.
56
148. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
149. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
150. Kitch, supra note 148, at 276-77.
151. ld. at 276.
152. Id. at 279.
153. Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 873.
154. Id. at 843.
155. Id. at 880.
156. Id.
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The ballpoint pen and many pharmaceutical products are discrete
inventions.157 Cumulative inventions, by contrast, build on earlier
efforts and interact with other technologies.1 58 Generally, they have
little intrinsic efficacy and provide value only through interactions
with existing technology and as mileposts in the development of new
technology. 59 Manufactured products, such as automobiles and
semiconductors, as well as software, are all products that comprise
numerous cumulative inventions.
60
Prospect theory does a good job of describing the development
of pharmaceutical products, which do face an overfishing problem.
Pharmaceutical chemical entities often require millions of dollars to
develop products.' 6' Without the ability to at least recover
development costs through patent protection, few firms would invest
in developing pharmaceuticals. Without patent protection, followers
would quickly enter the market for valuable inventions, driving the
price for such products down to the zero-profit point. This situation
would leave the inventor unable to recoup development costs. In
addition, redundant research on a chemical entity is socially wasteful
if a firm has a sufficiently high probability of successfully developing
the efficacious chemical entity. In such cases, society would be better
off if only one firm focused on the targeted product and other firms
reposition their investments. Therefore, once a firm creates a new
chemical entity, society benefits if that firm is able to manage or
curtail outside development of the chemical entity. Granting patent
rights to the first inventor of a discrete invention is unlikely to impede
development efforts of other firms because subsequent innovations
can and do generally proceed independently of the earlier
invention. 62 Therefore, blocking patents are not a concern for owners
of discrete inventions. By insuring that the original creator has the
ability to fully exploit the commercial value of an invention, granting
pharmaceutical patents provides incentives for firms to continue
developing new chemical entities.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 881.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 7, 9 (2003) ("It takes several hundred
million dollars to discover, develop and gain regulatory approval for a new medicine.").
162. Merges & Nelson, supra note 130, at 881 ("[P]ossession by [a patent holding] firm of
a proprietary lock on the invention is not a serious hindrance to inventive work by many other
firms.").
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3. Economic Taxonomy of Industrial Innovation
Burk and Lemley, in their analysis of judicial policy levers,
identify four other highly related types of innovation: competitive
innovation, cumulative-innovation, anti-commons, and patent
thicket. 163 In competitive innovation industries, companies have
incentives to innovate even in the absence of patent protection.
164
R&D is light or limited and companies gain sufficient incentive to
innovate from first-mover advantages or support from government
funding.165 In cumulative-innovation industries, inventors progress in
small, incremental steps building off the work of their predecessors.'
66
In such industries, optimal innovation occurs when patent rights are
narrow, thereby giving inventors incentives to create without blocking
the path of subsequent creators. 67 In an anti-commons industry,
innovators must assemble rights to advance or secure the value of
their innovations. 68 If rights are sufficiently dispersed, or an
uncooperative firm holds a critical right, then either high transaction
costs or inadequate patent coverage can turn the net value of an
innovation to the negative. 69 The final innovation type involves
"patent thickets.' 70 Patent thicket conditions are similar to anti-
commons conditions in that patent rights are highly complementary.
Under these conditions, multiple patent rights overlap, making it
extremely difficult to exercise the rights granted under a patent
without receiving licenses for all overlapping patents.1 7
Burk and Lemley identify industries that they believe are
archetypical of each of these innovation types. Competitive
innovation characterizes business methods and the early development
of software.' 72 In such industries, patents are largely unnecessary for
innovation. 73 According to their analysis, cumulative innovation
effectively describes modern software development.' 74 Burk and
163. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1604-14.
164. Id. at 1617-18.
165. Id. at 1618-19.
166. Id. at 1620.
167. Id. at 1609-10.
168. Id. at 161 I. See also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 11I HARv. L. REV. 621, 670-72 (1998).
169. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1611.
170. Id. at 1614.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1618-19.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1620.
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Lemley believe patent policy should narrow the scope of software
patents in order to minimize the harmful impact of software patents
on subsequent innovation. 175 Their analysis suggests that the anti-
commons condition describes biotechnology because of the relative
ease of developing close substitutes for efficacious chemical
entities.1 76 In such cases, the creator of the original product may not
be able to recover its high research and development costs, leaving it
with inadequate incentives to continue investing in innovation.
177
Therefore, Burk and Lemley recommend that patent scope for
biotechnology and other anti-commons industries be broad enough to
cover substitutes. 178 The patent-thicket condition describes the
semiconductor industry.' 79 In designing semiconductors, producers
must marshal a multitude of technologies. °80 To address the patent
thicket condition, Burke and Lemley recommend that examiners
construe patent scope narrowly in order to reduce the multitude of
overlapping patent rights that deter innovation. 181
4. Why Patents Do Not Promote Software Innovation
Although I find Burk and Lemley's policy recommendations for
anti-commons and patent thicket industries persuasive, I disagree with
their recommendations for modem software patents. The objective of
their analysis is to identify policies that create optimal incentives for
inventors and firms to innovate.' 82 Thus, for competitive-innovation
industries, patent protection is unnecessary because inventors receive
adequate rewards outside the patent system. In cumulative-innovation
industry, inventors may require some inducement, so patent policy
must be narrowly applied to provide this incentive without giving the
inventor so much protection that the patent impedes others from
innovating.' 8 3 However, rather than focus on innovation incentives at
the individual level, the focus should instead be on the impact of
patent policy on market-wide innovation levels.
The argument, advanced by Ben Klemens, that patent policy
should maximize the level of overall market innovation, is consistent
175. Id. at 1624-25.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1624-27.
178. Id. at 1681.
179. Id. at 1627-29.
180. Id. at 1627-28.
181. Id. at 1694-95.
182. Id. at 1578-79.
183. Id. at 1689.
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with the Patent Clause's mandate, "to promote the useful arts and
sciences." 18 4 If reducing individual patent rights increases market-
wide innovation, then society is better off. More importantly,
scientific progress is advanced more when overall innovation
increases than by increasing protection of individual patent rights. If
patent policy, instead, induces a few firms to increase their innovation
while obstructing industry-wide innovation, then society is worst off.
Therefore, the objective of this analysis is to determine how market-
level innovation varies with patent policy.
Market-wide software innovation is maximized when patent
protection is non-existent. Although software development has some
characteristics of a cumulative-innovation industry, competitive-
innovation is a closer fit. The cost, both in terms of capital investment
and risk of failure, of software development is relatively low.'
8 5
Moreover, first-mover advantages, together with lock-in effects from
switching costs and network externalities, are sufficient incentives to
insure continued software innovation. However, the existence of
software patents has a chilling effect on market-wide innovation,
resulting in a loss to society. The following discussion illustrates
these claims through a series of simple observations.
a. Observation 1: When R&D Costs are High There
are Strong Disincentives to Investing in Innovation
in the Absence of Patent Protection
When R&D costs are high, the incumbent inventor faces much
greater costs than rivals. If the rival is able to imitate the incumbent's
innovation inexpensively, then competitors are free to duplicate the
incumbent's innovation without incurring substantial research costs.
Their rapid market entry drives prices to the zero-profit level, leaving
the incumbent unable to recoup its initial R&D investment. As a
result, there is no innovation, because a profit-maximizing firm
refuses to invest when it faces a negative return. Thus, in this
situation, there is no innovation without patent protection.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology (biotech) are the archetype
industries for this condition.18 6 In biotech industries, R&D costs are
extremely high. It is not unusual for firms to spend millions of dollars
184. Klemens proposes to maximize the market size. However, this paper assumes that
increased market size is synonymous with increased innovation. KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 16
(2006).
185. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1687-88.
186. Id. at 1676.
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in research on a single chemical entity.187 In addition, there is a
significant probability that the research will fail either in the
laboratory or during clinic trials. 188 Competitors face much lower
R&D costs because they can learn from the incumbent's research and
public disclosures, so the cost of imitation is low. 89 A competitor
who produces an efficacious chemical entity without permission from
its creator can drive the price down to a point where the creator
cannot recover its research costs. Thus, without patent protection,
innovation declines precipitously in biotech industries.'
90
b. Observation 2: Patent Rights Provide Socially
Beneficial Innovation Incentives when R&D Costs
are High
Optimal patent protection can address the market failure
described above. In this condition, patents provide incumbents with
sufficient exclusivity to recover their investments, including a risk
premium. Optimal patent policy, defined by scope and term, can
increase the competitor's cost to a point where the incumbent can be
assured of receiving a positive expected return when the competitor
exploits the patent with a direct copy or close substitute. Society is
better off because the incumbent has the incentive to produce the
initial innovation, and the competitor has the incentive to improve the
invention or develop an efficacious substitute. Therefore, society can
end up with multiple efficacious products.
c. Observation 3: Patents do not Protect Patent
Holders from Competitors'Attempts to
Expropriate the Value of Patents when Patent
Scope is Sub-Optimally Narrow
In this condition, the competitor cannot duplicate the patent, but
the competitor's costs for developing and producing a substitute are
relatively low. The competitor has little difficulty producing a non-
infringing substitute with similar properties as the patent-protected
product. In the case of pharmaceuticals, the competitor may be able to
replace a key chemical in the patent with a chemical or compound
with similar properties without infringing the incumbent's patent.
187. Id. at 1616.
188. Id. at 1676.
189. See WILLAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 299 (2003) (identifying the ability of competitors to gain from
innovators' public disclosure as "incomplete appropriability").
190. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1677.
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Costs of producing a substitute are low. Therefore, if patent law does
not exclude production of the substitute through the doctrine of
equivalents, the patent has little value. 91 This condition corresponds
closely to the no-patent-protection condition. 192 As in that condition,
the incumbent under-invests in innovation because it is unlikely to
recover its R&D costs.
d Observation 4: Rivals Face Disincentives to
Producing Socially Beneficial Innovations when
Patent Scope is Sub-Optimally Broad
This condition describes a situation for which the incumbent
produces a socially beneficial software innovation that nets positive
profits. If the patent scope on this innovation is overly broad, then
competitors cannot profitably create market substitutes or
improvements without infringing the patent. Therefore, with
competitors unable to obtain a non-negative return in this market
segment, the incumbent innovator faces no competition. The patent is
an effective barrier to entry and the incumbent reaps supra-
competitive profits. There are significant social welfare losses
because not only is the incumbent able to charge prices above the
competitive level, but there also are no substitutes or improvements
because patent policy does not allow competitors to obtain a non-
negative profit. Thus, society loses innovations that it would have had
with a less exclusive patent.
Burk and Lemley agree with Klemens that the PTO treatment of
software patents results in an overly broad patent scope.193 The wide
breadth of software patent coverage makes it difficult for competitors
to produce improvements in areas for which the PTO has granted
software patents. 94 U.S. software patent policy exacerbates the
problem. Software patent applications do not include source code (the
program written in a human language) and the PTO often approves
claims consisting of little more than a rudimentary flow chart. 195
Thus, software patent holders lay claim to broad areas of software
practice without well-identified claim boundaries, with virtually no
implementation details, and with few clues about the quality of claim
191. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of equivalents).
192. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
193. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1594 ("[software patents that the CAFC] approves
will be entitled to broad protection"); KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 73.
194. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1622-23.
195. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 21-22.
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implementation.' 96 Burk and Lemley suggest that the appropriate way
to address these issues is by limiting software patent scope. 197 The
feasibility of this recommendation is discussed later in this analysis.'
98
However, as discussed below, this recommendation does not produce
an optimal outcome.
e. Observation 5.: The Cost of Producing Patentable
Software Innovation is Very Low Rrelative to the
Sosts of Producing R&D-Intensive Innovations
It is accepted that software development is far less expensive
than innovation in other industries. 99 However, Burk and Lemley
suggests that software development costs have increased due to the
complexity of modem end-user applications and time consuming
debugging cycles. 200 Although this claim is certainly correct, it does
not follow that the cost of patentable software innovation has
increased with the cost of developing final, polished consumer
products. To understand this difference, a distinction must be drawn
between software programs and software functions. Computer and
software consumers work with application programs such as word
processors, graphics programs, and customized applications. Complex
application programs, such as operating systems, may require years of
expensive development and debugging. 20 ' However, complex end-
user programs are rarely the subject of patents.20 2 Just as a car
contains many components and subsystems that are not entitled to
patent protection, complex application programs contain multiple
technologies for which only a subset are entitled to patent
protection.20 3  The software counterparts to these automobile
subsystems are known as "functions.
204
196. See id; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 24-25.
197. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1619.
198. See infra notes 327-349 and accompanying text.
199. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1618-19.
200. Id. at 1582-83.
201. See, e.g., Ina Fried, Microsoft: Vista is Ready to Roll, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 8,
2006, http://www.news.com/2100-1016-6133660.html (reporting the Jan. 2007 release of
Microsoft's updated operating system that was originally announced in Oct. 2003).
202. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 28 ("Many software inventions are internal
to the program, and their use cannot be detected without parsing the code.").
203. Id. at 29 (advocating a reverse-engineering exception for software patents to allow
developers to gain access to the unprotected components of application programs).
204. See WALTER SAVITCH, ABSOLUTE C++ 92 (Ist ed. 2002) ("Most programming
languages have functions or something similar to functions, although they are not always called
by that name in other languages.").
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Modem programming employs a modular approach to manage
the complexity of large programs. Again, the car analogy is
instructive. Cars contain tires, engines, brakes, and other components
that perform specific discrete tasks. Like cars, application programs
are built from multiple functions that produce specific program
behaviors.20 5 Software functions may specify how the program
handles data input-output or may provide methods for performing
mathematical and statistical operations.20 6 Typically, common and
related functions are assembled into function libraries, many of which
are generally available. 20 7 These libraries can be used to provide
capabilities for any program that requires the included tasks. 8
Programmers just need to know what the library functions do and
their syntax. 20 9 They do not need to know how the functions achieve
their results.210 In fact, it is possible to create a word processor and
other common computer applications using function libraries and just
enough programming code to integrate the functions into a cohesive
whole.21'
Therefore, it is at the function level-the building block level-
where patentable software subject matter is found. Software patents
are more valuable to patent holders when patent breadth is
maximized. Patents on critical functions that must be used in dozens
or hundreds of programs can provide licensing fees or significant
leverage in cross-licensing negotiations for patent rights 22 Such
patents also provide substantial benefit to the holder when embedded
in complex programs. Competitors are likely to incur high costs and
risks in creating program substitutes due to the difficulty of
213
ascertaining how basic patents are used in complex programs.
Therefore, development of patentable software differs from
R&D for other types of patentable innovation in two significant ways.
The R&D required to obtain software patents is both less expensive
and much less risky than other types of innovation. Biotech R&D
205. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 40.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 41; see also SAVITCH, supra note 204, at 92 ("C++ comes with libraries of
predefined functions that you can use in your programs").
208. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 41-42.
209. Id.
210. Id. at40.
211. Id. at 42.
212. See Dreyfuss, supra note 146, at 468.
213. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 27-29 (recommending the creation of a
reverse-engineering exemption for software due to the difficulty of identifying patentable
subject matter when developing software and engaged in infringement litigation).
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requires great expense and a significant probability of failure.2 14 By
contrast, the software R&D required to obtain a patent can literally be
conducted with paper and pencil due to the PTO's treatment of
software patent claims.2 15 The PTO, following the CAFC's guidance,
does not require the submission of written programs or other detailed
information about software patent claims .2 6 Therefore, a developer
can submit and win approval for a software patent claim after
conceiving of and outlining the basic capabilities of its software
patent claim and submitting a flowchart to the PTO. 217 There is no
need to have a working program or to even have started programming
the described functions.
21 8
The cost is further reduced by the very low risk of failure. If a
computer-based-task can be described, then a competent programmer
can write the code to execute the task.219 Although there may be a
significant risk of failure for implementing the full functionality of
complex programs, very little risk exists in implementing software
functions. Klemens suggests that if a programming task proves
difficult, programmers break the task down into smaller component
sub-functions until they are able to write code that implements the
designated task.220  Repetition of these steps and subsequent
aggregation of such sub-functions yields the desired program.
221
Essentially, patentable software innovation is entirely embodied in
conception of the new, useful, and non-obvious computer task. Once
the developer has devised an innovative software idea, there is very
little risk of failure.222 Hence, whereas the cost of developing complex
software programs may be high, the cost in time, money, and risk of
developing patentable software innovations is not high.
214. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
215. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1582 ("[I]t has long been possible for two
programmers working in a garage to develop a commercial software program.").
216. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 18.
217. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 21-23.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 43.
220. Id. See also Samuelson et al, supra note 5, at 2326 ("Programmers routinely work by
decomposing large tasks into smaller sub-tasks and sub-sub-tasks. They write a sub-program to
accomplish each of the smaller tasks, then orchestrate the sub-programs' interaction so that the
combination works together to accomplish an overall task.").
221. See, e.g., Samuelson et al, supra note 5, at 2326
222. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1687-88. See also KLEMENS, supra note 34,
at 43 ("Given a computable task, any two competent programmers could write a program to
perform the task.").
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f Observation 6: Optimal Software Innovation Does
Not Require Patent Protection
Patent protection is unnecessary to encourage software
development due to its low cost and risk. If software is indeed a
competitive innovation industry, then no further arguments are
needed. Rewards from other sources would be sufficient to stimulate
innovation.223 However, software development also has cumulative
innovation characteristics. 224 In such industries, narrowly tailored
patents are useful to induce optimal innovation levels. 225 Therefore,
the question is whether, for purposes of motivating innovation,
software development is predominately a competitive or cumulative
innovation industry.
Competitive innovation most accurately characterizes software
innovation incentives due to the upstream, component nature of
software innovation. Complex software applications, like complex
machines, are composed of many different components and
patentable innovation occurs at the component level.226 Thus,
software developers are motivated to solve problems that arise in
building complex applications. Application programs sold to end-
users protect software innovations without patents due to network
effects, switching costs, and the incumbent's ability to "hide" patent-
protected software in complex programs.
Network effects are present when the value of using a product
22increases with the total number of product users. 27 For example, a
video game console with a large market share is more beneficial
because it is easier to find other people with whom to play or
exchange games. Switching costs tend to lock people into a particular
standard due to the high cost of learning new skills, converting data,
and buying new equipment and applications. 228 As an illustration, few
users of a specific computer operating system change operating
223. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1618-19 (discussing the success of software
in times when software was not patentable); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 32 (1992) (asserting that patent protection for highly certain
projects does not matter because such projects "are likely to be pursued anyway").
224. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1620.
225. Id. at 1623.
226. See supra notes 202-213 and accompanying text. See also Burk & Lemley, supra
note 138, at 1590 ("Machines of even moderate complexity are composed of many different
pieces, and each of these components can itself be the subject of one or more patents.").
227. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424,424 (1985).
228. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J 987, 1009 n.60 (2003).
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systems because it would require purchasing new computers, new
software applications, and learning how to work in the new computer
environment. Therefore, it has been very difficult for Unix and Apple
Inc. operating systems to increase their market share even though
Microsoft's operating systems are frequently the subject of
criticism.
2 29
Finally, innovative functions are effectively hidden in
application programs. 230 Although it may be easier to reverse engineer
software without patent protection, the most effective method of
reverse engineering software, decompilation, is sufficiently time
consuming to provide software innovators with sufficient lead-time to
develop a first-mover advantage. 23 1 These three effects secure rewards
from marketable innovation while reducing the risk of rivals
appropriating the value of an incumbent's patent. Network
externalities and switching costs "lock in" users. Therefore, the
incumbent who produces a product with a positive revenue stream is
likely to maintain those rewards without patent protection. Thus,
patent protection is not required for software innovation.
g. Observation 7: Software Patents Reduce the
Overall Level of Software Innovation
The dynamics described above raise competitors' innovation
costs without providing an offsetting increase in the incumbent's
incentives. In addition, unlike other types of innovation, competitors
do not benefit from published software patents because the threshold
for meeting disclosure requirements for software patent claims is
low. 232 Thus, Landes and Posner's claim that patent public disclosure
requirements lower competitors' development costs does not apply to
233
software patents. 3 Instead, the limited disclosure requirement allows
software patent holders to carve out large areas of software practice
that competitors must avoid.234 Limited disclosure, broad patent
scope, and the prohibition against reverse engineering increase the
229. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1998) ("Apple's Macintosh [and other]
operating systems have, at certain times, been superior to the operating system offered by
Microsoft. Nevertheless, Microsoft's Windows system has gained an unassailable dominance..
. ."1).
230. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 28.
231. Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2336 ("[D]ecompilation is a painstaking and time-
consuming process.").
232. See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
233. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 189, at 299.
234. See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
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costs of developing substitutes as well as identifying areas of practice
that must be avoided. These increased costs act as a disincentive to
rival innovation. In addition, the patent-holding incumbent, as long as
it receives positive profits from its patent, has little incentive to
improve its product. Rather than innovate, the incumbent has a strong
incentive to maintain the positive profit flows from existing
products.235 Thus, both incumbent and competitors reduce their level
of software innovation when software patents are available. Hence,
when software patents cover a market, there is less software
innovation and less competition than in a patent-less regime.
5. Conclusion: Software Patents Do Not Enhance Social
Welfare
The economic model shows that software patents do not provide
incentives to innovate and reduce the aggregate level of software
innovation. This conclusion follows from the relatively low cost and
low risk associated with software innovation. Innovation in other
industries requires higher investments with lower probabilities of
recovering investments. In these industries, firms devote considerable
resources to research with a significant probability that the innovative
firm will not recover its investment. Given the size of the investment,
the innovation return must be at least as large as ongoing costs, plus
R&D costs. Therefore, profit-maximizing firms would not innovate in
high-investment industries absent patent protection because such
firms could not prevent others from expropriating the value of a
successful innovation. Without effective intellectual property
protection, competitors appropriate valuable innovations. Such
appropriation leaves the innovator without the means to recoup its
investment. This inability to recover innovation investments is a
market failure, and patents effectively correct this failure.
However, software innovation is not subject to this problem.
Rather, the application of patent policy to the software industry
results in social welfare losses with no gain because software
innovators do not risk losing sizable research investments and benefit
from market rewards. Patentable software innovation occurs during
idea conception and does not require extensive research and
experimentation like biotech and other industries. Once a software
producer conceives an innovative idea, code creation is a trivial and
deterministic exercise.236 After idea conception, the idea creator can
235. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
236. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 43.
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develop products using the idea with little risk that rivals will
expropriate the value of his creation. Any application of patent
protection at this point raises competitors' innovation costs and
reduces competition without increasing the incumbent's incentives to
innovate. Thus, rewarding software producers with patents fails to
satisfy the legislative mandate of promoting science.
B. Legal uncertainty and Patent Law
1. Overview of Legal Uncertainty
The remainder of this analysis considers the appropriate norms
and rules courts should adopt in effectuating these principles.
237
Desired rule characteristics include resolving disputes accurately and
expeditiously. A rule is accurate when its application is calculated to
achieve clearly identified policy results.238 Measuring normative
accuracy is difficult.239 However, useful proxies include consistency
and predictability. 240 Failure to accurately decide cases injects
inconsistency and lack of predictability into the rule application.241
Inconsistency in decision-making reduces confidence in the process,
increases transactions costs, and raises questions about the
appropriate allocation of rights.242 It can also have a stifling impact on
business because companies may be reticent to develop new products
or enter new markets when they cannot accurately predict whether
their interests will be protected. When decision rules are applied in an
inconsistent manner and there is a lack of predictability, high legal
uncertainty arises.
For these reasons, legal uncertainty inhibits innovation.
Inventors are deterred from investing in innovation when there is
significant uncertainty about whether the judiciary will protect
237. John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-Making Functions, Ex Porte
Communications, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH L.
REv. 1135, 1147 (1993) (describing the distinctions between policy objectives, principles and
rules).
238. Id. at 1149.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1158-59 (arguing that consistency and predictability flow from accuracy).
242. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 REP. OF THE 29TH ANN. MEETING OF THE A.B.A. 395, 408-09 (1906) (asserting that
uncertainty, delay, and expense have engendered a deep-seated distrust of the judicial process).
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innovations.243 Similarly, uncertainty about patent coverage deters
firms from innovating and significantly increases costs associated
with innovation due to the threat of infringement allegations.244 In
patent law, uncertainty can increase litigation and appellate activity
because parties are unable to resolve disputes without judicial
intervention.245 Uncertainty in litigation increases appellate activity
and reduces faith in the judicial process when parties consider trial
outcomes unreliable and unpredictable.
246
Uncertainty in patent litigation may also encourage opportunistic
behavior. High reversal rates on appeal, in addition to diminishing
judicial credibility, may encourage parties with low-merit cases to
exploit high trial error rates. Thus, if a multi-million-dollar award is at
stake, a plaintiff can have a positive expected return without a
strongly meritorious case. Moreover, because the threat to litigate is
credible due to lack of predictability, defendants without deep pockets
may settle such claims rather than incur litigation expenses and risk
an inaccurate ruling. Many high-technology companies believe that
pejoratively labeled "patent trolls" are responsible for many patent
infringement cases they face.247 If such strategic behavior exists, then
uncertainty, high judicial error rates, and high potential awards are
major catalysts.
The relationship between uncertainty and litigation rates has
been the subject of multiple studies.248 With symmetric interests and
in the absence of uncertainty, all disputes between rational parties
settle. Under these conditions, both sides agree on the expected
outcome of trial, so it is less costly for the parties to settle and avoid
litigation costs. In this situation, if both sides face positive costs, the
243. See Gregory J. Wallace, Note, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent
Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court
with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1390 (2004).
244. See Thomas, Vanquishing, supra note 1, at 721-22.
245. See Wallace, supra note 243, at 1383.
246. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
247. See Thomas, Vanquishing, supra note 1, at 721-22.
248. See Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New
Evidence through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1999); Theodore
Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution,
28 RAND J. ECON. S92 (1997); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-
Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 233 (1996); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, 111, The Selection of Employment
Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995); George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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plaintiff's net expected gain is always greater than the defendant's net
expected loss. Therefore, both sides are better off without going to
trial. However, when uncertainty causes the two sides to disagree
about the expected outcome of litigation, no "positive settlement
zone" exists, leaving trial as the only outcome.
In their seminal work on litigation, George Priest and Benjamin
Klein provided a theory that identifies the characteristics of disputes
selected for trial.249 Their theory identifies the cases that are likely to
produce the greatest disagreement between disputing sides, thereby
resulting in trial. ° In these circumstances, the plaintiffs case is very
close to the decision standard. 25' The decision standard is the point at
which the facts and evidence is just enough for the plaintiff to prevail
at trial.252 When cases strongly favor or disfavor the plaintiff, the
parties may disagree about how strong or how weak the case is, but
they do not disagree about who is going to prevail. 3 By contrast,
when a case is close to the decision standard, even small differences
in the parties' respective evaluations of the case could result in
radically different beliefs about the case prospects. 4 Therefore, if
disputes are evenly distributed, then the Priest-Klein theory predicts
that the vast majority of cases settle, and that non-settling cases are
"close" cases. 5
The Priest-Klein theory has been controversial and is most
famous for its fifty percent result. This theory predicts that as the
uncertainty about the likely trial result approaches zero, plaintiffs win
fifty percent of fully adjudicated cases.256 The apparent failure of this
prediction has obscured the strength of the Priest-Klein theory.
Several studies have examined trial data for evidence of a fifty
percent result. 7 The data did not support said result. Instead, the data
258
suggested that plaintiff win rates vary significantly by case type.
However, this data does not invalidate the Priest-Klein theory. Rather,
249. Priest & Klein, supra note 248.
250. Id. at 16.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 8.
253. Id. at 14.
254. Id. at 15.
255. Id. at 15-16.
256. Id. at 17.
257. See Kessler et al., supra note 248; Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 248; Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection
of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection
Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990).
258. See Eisenberg, supra note 248, at 340.
DEBUGGING SOFTWARE PATENTS
the data accentuates the importance of uncertainty in determining trial
rates. Researchers have shown that when there is uncertainty, a non-
zero standard deviation exists around each side's beliefs, resulting in
win rates that are inconsistent with the Priest-Klein selection
hypothesis.259 With positive uncertainty, there can be systematic
biases due to case type260 or asymmetric information that causes win
rates to diverge from fifty percent.261
Researchers have identified an optimism bias for which the sum
of each side's probabilistic beliefs about their respective prospects
exceeds one.262 In such cases, one or both sides may be overly
optimistic about the trial outcome, preventing the parties from
identifying a mutually acceptable settlement. Uncertainty about trial
prospects exacerbates these biases.263
There are several types of litigation-related uncertainty, all of
which result in welfare losses. With increased uncertainty, the
precision of the parties' beliefs around the decision standard declines,
thereby increasing the probability that the parties disagree
significantly about the plaintiffs prospects. The implication of this
increased probability is that a greater proportion of disputes go to trial
than when the parties' beliefs are more precise. Factual uncertainty
produces a situation of asymmetric information. For example, Hylton
suggests that the defendant in certain tort actions may have superior
knowledge about his level of care.264 Therefore, said defendant has a
more precise estimate of his prospects than does the plaintiff.265 There
may also be legal uncertainty when there is an uncertain legal
standard. Uncertainty about the degree of proof required, the nature of
the legal standard, or how the legal standard applies to known facts
are sources of legal uncertainty.266
259. See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50
Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 224-25 (1995) [hereinafter,
Thomas, Selection]; Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993).
260. See Thomas Selection, supra note 259, at 225.
261. See Hylton, supra note 259, at 188; Shavell, supra note 259, at 500.
262. Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337 (1995); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993) (finding that assessments of trial prospects are
biased in a self-serving fashion).
263. See Thomas Selection, supra note 259, at 225.
264. Hylton, supra note 259, at 188-89.
265. See id. at 199.
266. See Siegelman & Waldfogel, supra note 248, at 101.
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2. Legal Uncertainty and Patent Law
Legal uncertainty is prevalent in patent disputes due to the highly
technical subject matter and the complex decisions patent law
requires of examiners and judges. In patent claims and patent validity
disputes, the parties typically agree about relevant facts, but may
disagree about whether the accepted facts support the plaintiffs
claims. For example, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
2 6 7
the Supreme Court allocated the responsibility of patent claim
construction to judges because, "construction of written instruments is
one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better
than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.,, 268 Theoretically, the
expertise of judges in interpreting technical documents would
increase the accuracy of claim construction.269 However, empirical
studies have shown that appellate reversal rates for claim-construction
disputes are quite high, ranging between twenty-nine percent and
thirty-three percent.270 Moreover, if we include claim-construction
judgments modified on appeal among the set of imperfectly decided
cases, then appellate courts changed a whopping forty-four percent of
patent claim-construction appeals. 27' Thus, data does not support the
hypothesis that judges have an advantage in interpreting technical
documents.
These high reversal and modification rates show that even with
judge-rendered decisions, error rates and uncertainty are unusually
high. Empirical research suggests that judges and juries tend to agree
on fact situations 68% of the time.272 In addition, Clermont and
Eisenberg show that federal courts affirm district courts 80% of the
time.273 By contrast, claim-construction-affirmance rates were roughly
60%,274 a substantial deviation from the overall 80% federal court
267. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
268. Id. at 388.
269. See Wallace, supra note 243, at 1390.
270. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (finding a 29.6% error rate); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
3 (2001) (finding a 33% error rate).
271. See Chu, supra note 270, at 1104.
272. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 144 (2002).
273. Id. at 152 (attributing the deviation from the expected fifty percent rate to the low cost
of appealing a trial judgment, thereby indicating that appellate cases are drawn randomly from
all fully adjudicated trial cases rather than drawing solely from the subset of closely decided
cases).
274. See Wallace, supra note 243, at 1391.
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affirmance rate that Clermont and Eisenberg observed. 275 This
deviation of claim-construction-affirmance rates from overall federal
court affirmance rates can be attributed to uncertainty, high judicial
discretion, and complex subject matter.
Judges as well as commentators have recognized the connection
between high judicial discretion, case complexity, and uncertainty. 276
For example, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushika
Co. (Festo 4,277 the CAFC attempted to balance the tradeoff between
judicial discretion and certainty in ruling on the complex question of
the application of prosecution history estoppel.278 Specifically, the
CAFC determined how the PTO should apply prosecution history
estoppel in infringement cases based on the doctrine of equivalents.
279
Traditionally, the application of prosecution history estoppel in
cases alleging infringement by equivalent products has required
courts to make complex, subjective determinations. The doctrine of
equivalents allows patent holders to obtain recovery for infringement
when the defendant's product deviates from the patent's exact claim
specifications. To avoid injustice, courts allow recovery under the
doctrine of equivalents when the deviation is insignificant because,
for all intents and purposes, the defendant is practicing the patent with
his product.280 In such situations, the defendant should not escape
infringement liability simply by replacing a chemical with one
possessing similar properties or by changing materials in a
mechanical device when this change does not improve or alter the
device's performance.
However, patent holders, in negotiating with examiners,
sometimes alter or limit claims in order to obtain approval for their
patents. 28 Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent holder from
asserting that a defendant's product is equivalent to that of the patent
holder when the allegedly infringing characteristics fall within the
scope of claims that the patent holder voluntarily surrendered during
275. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 272, at 151-52.
276. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting);
Wallace, supra note 243, at 1396.
277. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en bane), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2001).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 563.
280. Id. at 564 (explaining that "[t]he doctrine of equivalents prevents an accused infringer
from avoiding liability for infringement by changing only minor or insubstantial details of a
claimed invention while retaining the invention's essential identity.").
281. See LEE B. BURGUNDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MANAGING TECHNOLOGY 153-54 (1st
ed., 2001).
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patent prosecution.28 2 Determining when the prosecution history
estops a plaintiff from asserting infringement is a highly
unpredictable task that courts must perform.
The question that the CAFC addressed in Festo I was whether
the existence of any patentability-related prosecution-history
concessions should completely bar infringement allegations based on
equivalents. The pre-existing rule required courts to determine
whether the scope of patent prosecution concessions encompassed the
subject matter of an allegedly infringing product (flexible bar).283
Under the flexible bar, the court determines whether prosecution
history provides evidence that the patent holder surrendered the right
to claim exclusivity over related creations that are the subject matter
of a patent infringement claim. 284 Frequently, the prosecution record
does not reveal the rationale for amendments or whether the patent
examiner's concerns would have been allayed with a more limited
concession. 285 The absence of a complete record clouds this
determination with uncertainty.2 86 Without being able to ascertain
specifically what subject matter the patent holder may have yielded,
the court's decision about the scope of surrender is anything but
deterministic. 287 As a result, the decisions in such cases are highly
unpredictable.2 88
In Festo, the CAFC recognized the uncertainty inherent in such
subjective determinations and therefore opted to remove judicial
discretion by imposing a complete bar in prosecution history estoppel
cases. 289 The CAFC noted that, "it is virtually impossible to predict
,,290before the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn.
The CAFC considered the degree of uncertainty created under the
flexible bar to be so great that consistent results and marketplace
guidance were highly limited. 29' Defining consistency and guidance
282. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (explaining that "[p]rosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining under
the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been relinquished during the
prosecution of its patent application.").
283. See Wallace, supra note 243, at 1388.
284. Festo, 234 F.3d at 572.
285. Id. at 573.
286. Id. at 574 (asserting that "[t]here is uncertainty as to the extent of the surrender that
will be held to exist.").
287. Id. at 577.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 574.
290. Id. at 575.
291. Id.
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to be critical characteristics of "workable" rules, the court concluded
that, "[the flexible bar rule's] 'workability' is flawed., 292 The CAFC
feared that the flexible bar created a disincentive to innovation
because,
[I]t is impossible... for the public or the patentee to determine the
precise range of equivalents available under the flexible bar
approach. This creates a "zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement
claims ... [and which] discourages invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field.,
293
The CAFC believed that eliminating this uncertainty would not
only reduce excessive litigation, but would significantly reduce the
disincentives to innovation associated with the flexible bar rule.294
The complete bar would give the public notice of the patent's
boundaries, thereby freeing innovators to improve existing
technologies without fearing allegations of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 295 The CAFC believed that removing this
uncertainty would also stimulate investment in innovation. 296 A
complete bar eliminates the implicit tax associated with the
uncertainty of not knowing whether the courts would consider a
potential innovation infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.297
Thus, developers would find certain projects that have a negative
expected return under the flexible bar to have a positive expected
return under a complete bar. 298 Concluding that the benefits to patent
holders of a flexible bar did not offset the substantial benefits to
society of a complete bar, the CAFC made a utilitarian decision in
favor of a complete bar.
299
The CAFC's Festo rejection of the flexible bar rule did not last
long. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Festo I in Festo 11.300
The Court rejected the CAFC's conclusion that reducing uncertainty
292. Id.
293. Id. at 577 (alteration in original).
294. Id. (asserting that "[tlechnological advances that would have lain in the unknown,
undefined zone around the literal terms of a narrowed claim under the flexible bar approach will
not go wasted and undeveloped due to fear of litigation.").
295. Id. at 576.
296. Id. at 577.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 578.
300. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002).
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outweighs the benefits to patent holders of applying a flexible bar.
30 1
While acknowledging the CAFC's concerns about the negative
impact of uncertainty, the Court stressed that elevated uncertainty is
the cost of "ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation. '" 30 2 In
particular, the Court was concerned that the abrupt rejection of the
flexible bar rule unacceptably disrupted "the settled expectations of
the inventing community. 30 3 The Court considered the CAFC's
decision to be a gross violation of stare decisis. The switch to a
complete bar would "risk destroying the legitimate expectations of
inventors in their property" based on multiple years of patent activity
under the flexible bar rule.30 4 The switch would disrupt business
investments and patent strategies created in reliance on this rule.30 5
The Court was unwilling to allow such a profound change in patent
policy solely for the purpose of increasing certainty.30 6 Thus, in the
Court's calculus, protecting settled expectations and patent
investment decisions trumped any gains arising from increased
certainty associated with the CAFC's dramatic rule change.
The Supreme Court's Festo H decision illustrates that patent
reforms must be reviewed for their impact on efficiency, legal
uncertainty, and settled expectations. Any gains from implementing
efficient patent policy may be nullified by losses resulting from
increased litigation due to uncertainty. In addition, the Court made it
clear that stare decisis provides an additional constraint to policy
alternatives. 30 7 The Court is unlikely to validate any judicial-based
reforms that deviate dramatically from settled law. Therefore, before
evaluating the efficacy of software patent reform recommendations,
this paper reviews the current software patent case law to determine
exactly what settled law allows.
IV. ADDRESSING THE SOFTWARE PATENT PROBLEM
The objective in reforming software patent policy must include
enhancing both social welfare and legal certainty. Any gains in social
welfare due to policy changes may be offset by increased legal
uncertainty in the handling of software patent disputes. In addition,
301. Id. at 737.
302. Id. at 732.
303. Id. at 739.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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gains due to policy changes must not severely violate the principle of
stare decisis. Changing the rules after firms have invested in reliance
on current law can result in substantial economic losses as well as a
loss of faith in the legal system.
308
The following section considers the effectiveness of judicial
policy in addressing the problem of software patents. Therefore,
popular recommendations that require legislative action such as
reducing software patents terms and sui generis solutions are not a
consideration. 0 9
A. Are Policy Levers the Answer to Software Patent Problems?
The judiciary is in the best position to effect change. Some
commentators have recommended the use of judicial "policy levers"
to enhance the efficiency of various patent types. 3 10 Policy levers are
essentially approaches that courts apply to certain cases or fact
situations to advance policy objectives, such as enhancing
efficiency. 3 11 Policy levers fall within the bounds of a court's
discretion and can be used to tailor the application of precedent and
legislation to specific industries.3 12 Burk and Lemley believe that the
policy lever approach is particularly appropriate for ameliorating
patent approval and infringement issues because innovation is
heterogeneous. 313 According to Burk and Lemley, the CAFC is in the
best position to shape patent law to most effectively deal with the
issues that arise from the diversity of modem innovation.3 14 However,
this recommendation by no means precludes the Supreme Court from
exerting its authority in customizing judicial patent policy.31 5
Burk and Lemley criticize the CAFC for incorrectly applying
industry-specific patent policy levers. 31 6 Software innovation is
incremental, relatively certain, and low in cost. Therefore, patent
scope should be limited and bounded both generationally and by
subject matter.31 7 To effectuate these policy objectives, Burk and
308. See id. at 730-31.
309. See Thomas & DiMatteo, supra note 5, at 42-44; Samuelson, supra note 5, at 1135.
310. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138.
311. Id. at 1579.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 1d.
315. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) (requiring the
application of a stricter standard in making obviousness determinations).
316. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1579.
317. Id. at 1688-89.
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Lemley recommend the CAFC: (i) tailor the obviousness requirement
to facilitate patent awards for limited incremental improvements, (ii)
bolster the software disclosure requirements for best mode and
enablement purposes, (iii) limit the expansive coverage of the
doctrine of equivalents, and (iv) recognize a software reverse
engineering exception.
318
1. Increased Disclosure for Software Patents is
Problematic
Burk and Lemley are critical of the CAFC's failure to apply
available policy levers in the manner they recommend. 31 9 However,
given the constraints the CAFC faces, the nature of software
innovation, and the CAFC's pro-software-patent bias,32° the CAFC's
approach is completely logical. First, the Supreme Court, in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 32 1 raised the bar for satisfying the
non-obviousness requirement, making it more difficult to use the non-
obviousness test as a policy lever to increase software patent claim
approval rates.322  Secondly, increasing software disclosure
requirements will reduce-perhaps dramatically-the number of
successful patent claims and introduce unintended consequences.
Specifically, increasing disclosure requirements for software claims
reduces the value of software patents and increases legal uncertainty.
For software patent claims, the CAFC relaxed the Patent Act
disclosure requirements. Patent law requires a patent application to
contain sufficient detail so that a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art can replicate the invention.323 For software, providing
source code or detailed outlines of how the code performs its
functions would satisfy the literal meaning of the enablement and best
mode requirements. 324 However, the CAFC has ruled that software
claims do not have to provide this level of detail. 325 Instead,
disclosing functions alone is enough to satisfy § 112 demands.326 For
318. Id. at 1689-91.
319. See id. at 1650.
320. See supra notes 90-129 and accompanying text.
321. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
322. Id at 1739 (2007).
323. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
324. The term "function" here refers to an invention's capabilities. The usage here should
not be confused with previous reference to functions as components of a software program. See
supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
325. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 908 (1997).
326. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 24 n.87.
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most patent claims, patent law provides protection solely for the
means of achieving identified functions (the "means-plus-function"
test).327 Previously, courts considered functions to be unpatentable
subject matter like ideas and algorithms.328 Courts agreed that patents
were appropriate for protecting innovative ways of accomplishing a
task, but patent claims based solely on functions were
inappropriate. 329 Patents protected the identified means, leaving other
innovators the freedom to develop new methods of accomplishing the
same tasks and functions without infringing related patents.330 By
contrast, the lax disclosure requirements for software patents allow a
software patent holder to gain coverage over technology that extends
beyond the patent boundaries.
331
However, requiring software patents to meet the means-plus-
function criteria is problematic. Source code appears to be the
quintessential way of meeting this patentability test. However, such
submissions would have limited efficacy.332 There may be thousands
of ways to achieve the same programming result. Programmers may
use different routines, approaches and languages to accomplish the
same programming task.333 Asking multiple programmers to write a
program to accomplish a stated task will certainly produce multiple
programs, many of which differ in significant ways.334 Many of these
programs will achieve the desired functionality using different means.
Therefore, instituting a means-plus-function test for software by
limiting software patent scope to the four corners of source code or a
327. See Fidel D. Nwamu, Does Your Claim Conform to Means-Plus-Function Format
Under Section 112, Paragraph Six?: 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 189, 194-
95 (1999) (observing that means-plus-function claims while satisfying § 112 requirements do so
at the expense of limiting patent claim scope to the designated structures or acts identified in the
claim).
328. See Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854) ("[I]t is well settled that a man
cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine
which produces it.").
329. See Ford, supra note 4, at 60 n.59 (citing cases that find purely functional claims
deficient).
330. See id
331. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 25-26.
332. See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting
an expert witness testifying that source code "wouldn't help someone ... anyway because [the
code is machine specific]. What's much more important is to have a description of what the
software has to do.").
333. See KLEMENS, supra note 34, at 43.
334. Id. ("In view of the astounding number of choices available [when completing the
same computer task], the two programmers' solutions could be vastly different.").
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detailed description of the program gives the patent holder very little
value.
In addition, the application of a means-plus-function test to
software source code would dramatically elevate legal uncertainty by
requiring examiners and judges to make difficult discretionary
judgments. Source code can be written in thousands of different
programming languages.335 It is unlikely that PTO examiners would
be conversant in more than a handful of these programming language.
Examiners would have to make subjective judgments in comparing
source code written in different languages using different
programming styles. The PTO and courts would have to either accept
small variations in source code as non-infringing or engage in the
arduous exercise of judging whether such code variations are
sufficiently different to be non-infringing.
Even allowing submission of information other than source code
to meet the increased disclosure requirements would fuel legal
uncertainty. Patent examiners and judges would still have to use
submitted information to distinguish between patentable software
means and unpatentable functions. This complex calculus would
introduce ambiguity that would make the determination of software
patentability subjective and highly uncertain. This ambiguity would
result in increased litigation due to uncertainty about software patent
validity. Therefore, the error rates associated with software patent
prosecutions would increase.336 The increased error rates, combined
with the ambiguity and uncertainty accompanying examiners'
subjective determinations, would fuel conflict and litigation.337 Thus,
increased disclosure would exacerbate rather than reduce welfare
losses.
While dealing with the software disclosure issue, the CAFC
opted to grant software patents for entire functions, independent of
any identified means.338 It follows that comparatively fewer software
335. See Diarmuid Pigott, HOPL: An Interactive Roster of Programming Languages,
http://hopl.murdoch.edu.au (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (cataloging 8512 distinct programming
languages).
336. There are two types of error: rejecting a patent claim covering a patentable innovation
(type I error), and approving a patent claim covering an innovation just should not be patented
(type 11 error). See RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 299 (2d ed. 1986).
337. See Wallace, supra note 243, at 1384 ("[U]ncertainty at the trial level is inefficient
because it stimulates appeals rather than settlements.").
338. See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[W]here
software constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best
mode is satisfied by a disclosure of the functions of the software.").
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patents are granted because such grants of exclusivity are by
definition broad.339 Software patents cover all means of achieving a
function, therefore no room exists for multiple patents covering
differing methodologies for a given functional outcome. The CAFC
had little choice in radically departing from disclosure and
enablement requirements. The CAFC's dilemma is that there is no
middle ground. Policy makers and courts can either grant minimal
patent protection for specific methods that convey no valuable
exclusivity or grant patents that essentially cover all ways of
accomplishing identified tasks.
In dealing with this dilemma, the CAFC opted to provide
software developers with valuable patents. 340 This choice is not
surprising. Since dismantling the physical-transformation test, the
CCPA and the CAFC cases have been highly supportive of, and
responsible for, the expanded scope of software patentability.3 41 Once
committed to the proposition that software innovation is valid patent
subject matter, the relaxation of software patent claim disclosure
requirements was inevitable. More germane to this discussion, the
negative impact of increased software patent claim disclosure on legal
uncertainty makes increasing disclosure for such claims an inferior
policy lever.
2. The Doctrine of Equivalents and Reverse Engineering
Using the doctrine of equivalents as a policy lever for software
innovation is likely to yield more positive results. However, it is
unlikely to fully address the software disclosure dilemma. Cohen and
Lemley urge the courts to use the doctrine of equivalents to modify
software patent scope. Effectively employing this policy lever would
increase efficiency by reducing software patent scope. However,
narrowing patent scope in this way requires judges to employ
substantial subjectivity in rendering decisions. Uncertainty associated
with this high level of discretion is likely to spawn significant
litigation. Nevertheless, judges already wield significant discretion in
339. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1688.
340. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d at 1549 ("As a general rule, where software
constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is
satisfied by a disclosure of the functions of the software."); In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods.,
Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1537-39 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (concluding that there was no best mode violation
where detailed specifications of microprocessor firmware were excluded but provided
information was sufficient to allow one skilled in the art to write firmware with the functionality
of the missing firmware).
341. See supra notes 90-129 and accompanying text.
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deciding doctrine of equivalents cases.342 Hence, it is unclear whether
narrowing software patent scope for these cases increases uncertainty.
Yet, it is possible that the transition to the new, stricter standard is a
disequilibrium condition. Once the courts have adopted a new, stricter
standard, uncertainty may decline to pre-transition levels or lower.
Thus, narrowing software patent scope in doctrine-of-equivalents
cases is likely a beneficial step.
Carving out a reverse-engineering exception would enhance
efficiency as well. The analysis in Part III A demonstrated that
software patents reduce innovation by raising the costs of producing
similar non-infringing products.343 Cohen and Lemley argue that
reverse engineering can provide a competitor with knowledge needed
to produce non-infringing products. 344 It may be difficult for software
developers to determine the limits of patent-protected functions that
are incorporated into larger, complex software programs. Developers
need to deconstruct software programs to gain access to "unprotected
elements." 345 Such knowledge would allow developers to avoid
producing infringing products, reducing both development costs and
legal uncertainty because there would be less ambiguity about
whether competitive products infringe.
The Burk and Lemley policy-lever recommendations are a mixed
bag. Using non-obviousness and software patents claim disclosure as
recommended would likely diminish, rather than increase, social
welfare. The doctrine of equivalents and reverse-engineering policy
levers have a moderating effect, but only address a subset of software
patent issues. The doctrine of equivalents reform would not impact
literal infringement claims. In addition, if after reverse engineering a
program, a developer discovers that the functionality it needs to create
a new product is subject to a patent, then his path is still barred.
Therefore, policy levers are only partially ameliorative.
B. Reinstating the Physical- Transformation Test
The Supreme Court's physical-transformation test is the best of
the judicial branch's limited alternatives. The physical-transformation
test enhances social welfare and reduces legal uncertainty, but at the
342. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002)
(reversing the CAFC's attempt to eliminate the flexible bar standard in prosecution history
estoppel cases).
343. See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
344. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 29.
345. Id. at 6.
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expense, perhaps, of settled expectations. Strict application of the test
will dramatically reduce the issuance of weak software and business
method patents, which, rather than spur innovation, deter competitors
from innovating.346
The test reduces legal uncertainty because it requires the PTO to
approve patent claims only when they include a physical, tangible
result and rejects patent claims that solely manipulate data or that
solely produce visual or audio output. Reiteration of the principles
advanced in the Supreme Court software precedents would provide
clear identification of the boundaries of software patent subject
matter.347 Process patent claims that accept data input from an EKG or
output a data analysis to a computer monitor or chart, as in
Arrhythmia Research, would not satisfy the physical-transformation
test. Similarly, programs that manipulate digital audio, photographic,
and video data would not qualify as patent subject matter under the
physical-transformation test.
The most serious challenge to reinstating the physical-
transformation test is the potential harm to the settled expectations of
market players. In Festo II, the Supreme Court was clear that the
benefits from increased certainty did not offset the damage to existing
patent holders' expectations of how courts would handle their
infringement claims.348 Changing the rule would be unfair because
patent claimants may have chosen not to concede examiner claim
challenges had they known that such concessions would result in a
subsequent bar. 349 In essence, Festo I could result in a taking of patent
rights without such holders having an opportunity to contest their
losses.
There are significant differences that distinguish software patents
from the main issue decided in Festo II. There, the Supreme Court
expressed agitation that the CAFC had revisited an issue and upset the
balance that the Court previously had struck in Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 350 The CAFC's embrace of a complete
bar amounted to a repudiation of the Supreme Court's flexible bar
standard in Warner-Jenkinson. For software patents, the reverse
occurred. The CAFC's embrace of an unrestricted standard for
346. See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part II.
348. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(quoting Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 (1997)).
349. Id.
350. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997).
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software patents is a repudiation of the balance embodied in the
Court's physical-transformation test. Thus, reinstating the physical-
transformation test would restore the balance of interests that the
Court struck in its software patent cases.
In changing the treatment of software patents, the Court can
avoid disturbing "settled expectations" by differentiating between
existing patents and prospective claims. In Festo H, the expectations
issue concerned preserving the prospective value of patents.3 5' Many
patent holders who had made seemingly minor concessions during
patent prosecution would lose all rights to challenge equivalents
under the Festo I complete bar.352 Judge Linn's dissent in Festo I
raised strong concerns that adoption of a complete bar would have a
retroactive impact rather than solely a prospective toll.
353
Reinstating the Supreme Court's physical-transformation test for
process claims need not produce an analogous harm to existing patent
holders. If the Court chooses to apply the physical-transformation test
prospectively, then only future software patent claims would need to
satisfy that standard. Existing software and business method patents
would be grandfathered, leaving the expectations of existing patent
holders intact. Although there arguably could be losses from software
investments in anticipation of receiving a patent, such losses would
not be comparable to those anticipated in Festo H. As argued in Part
III, software patent R&D is much less resource exhaustive and less
dependent on patent protection than other types of innovation.354
Therefore, disturbing settled expectations due to reinstatement of the
physical-transformation test for software patent claims is not
comparable to the corresponding issue in Festo II.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cohen and Lemley's comment that the Court has "assiduously
avoided" addressing software patents for over twenty-five years is
accurate.35 5 However, there is evidence that the Court is awake and
aware of the morass that engulfs software and business method
patents. Innovation is not homogeneous, and therefore, a single patent
policy is not appropriate for all innovation types. Although strong
351. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.
352. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2001).
353. Id. at 638 (Linn, J., dissenting).
354. See supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
355. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 4.
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patent protection may be necessary for high-cost innovation such as
pharmaceuticals, applying such policy to low-cost software and
business method inventions impedes rather than promotes innovation.
With Congress unlikely to address this issue and the CAFC
biased in favor of software and business method patents, it is
imperative for the Supreme Court to fine-tune patent policy for
software and business method patents. If the Court does intervene, the
only effective policy lever is reinstatement of its physical-
transformation test. The Burk and Lemley policy levers do not go far
enough in ameliorating this patent malaise. In addition, increasing
software patent disclosure requirements would likely aggravate the
problem. The advantage of revitalizing the physical-transformation
test and applying it prospectively is that it would promote software
innovation and reduce software patent litigation, while simultaneously
protecting the interests of existing software patent holders. Without
intervention of this type, the problems associated with software and
business method patents will continue to plague the patent system for
many years to come.
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